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Prospects for Local Competition in
Telecommunications: A Comparison of
the Chilean and American Approaches to
Regulatory Reform
BY MELISSA SAMPSON MCMORROW::=
Introduction
For decades, most nations provided telecommunications services
through regulated monopolies or by state-owned entities. It was well
accepted that because providing telephone service required intensive
capital investments, the industry was a natural monopoly.! That is,
according to accepted economic theory, the most efficient means of
providing the service was through one supplier." The United States
chose the regulated monopoly route.' Many nations, including Latin
American countries, provided such services through state-owned
industries for various reasons.4 Many national governments wanted
control over the industry because they believed that
telecommunications was a national security concern.' Moreover, fees
raised from telephone consumers provided a significant source of
revenue for government coffers.
Technological advancements and regulatory reform have
dismantled the old guard systems and have ushered in a new era in
* J.D. candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2000.
1. See HENNING KLODT, REGULATION OF PRIVATIZED NETWORKS: THE CASE OF
TELECONMNUNICATIONS 298 (1995).
2. Id
3. See generally Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,602,48 Stat. 104, 1102.
4. See generally Cristian Larroulet Vignau, Privatization in Chile, in
PRVATIZATION - A GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE (Routledge Pub. 1993).
5. See generally Raines, The Global Scale-back of Government Involvement in
National Economies: Telecommunications: Privatization of Telecommunications in
Latin America, 48 ADmNr. L. REv. 479 (1996).
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telecommunications.7 Latin American countries are going through a
dual process of privatization and liberalization. Chile led the region
in this effort in the late 1970's.8 Chile also led the world in creating a
competitive market for telecommunications. Its legal framework has
opened all markets-long distance, advanced, and local-to
competition to varying extents Two years after the Chilean reform,
Congress passed and the President signed into law the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act" or "the 1996 Act"),
which promised to break down regulatory barriers and usher in
competition.1" In the three years since the Act, a competitive market
for long distance and other advanced telecommunications services
has thrived. However, basic local service is provided through several
geographic, or regional, monopolies."
In this paper, I will compare the successes, failures, and
challenges of the United States and Chile in their transitions to
reformed, competitive markets. Particularly, I will focus on each
country's success in achieving competition in the local market. Part I
addresses the historical framework and development of the
telecommunications industry and telecommunications law in Chile
and the United States. Part II discusses the regulatory and economic
reforms that occurred in both countries. Part III examines the
current competitive structure of the local telecommunications
markets in Chile and the United States. Finally, part IV draws on the
experiences in Chile to make suggestions for regulatory reform in the
laws regulating local telecommunications service in the United
States.
I. Historical Framework
A. Chile
Most Latin American countries employed the state ownership
model in providing telecommunications service. 2 The governments
7. See KLODT, supra note 1, at 299.
8. See Jose Ricardo Melo, Chile, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN .ATIN AMERICA
202 (Eli M. Noam ed. 1998).
9. Id.
10. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
11. See Competition in Telecommunications: Hearing of the hfouse Judiciary
Committee, 106' Cong. (1998) statement of Rep. John Conyers (D-MI).
12. See Miguel D. Ramirez, Privatization and Regulatory Reform in Mexico and
Chile: a Critical Overview; The Changing Role of International Capital in Latin
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controlled the industry for several reasons. First, many countries felt
that national security dictated that the government control the
telephone networks and the activity that occurred over such
networks.' Second, state ownership also allowed the government to
subsidize service to non-urban areas and control more closely the
entity's operations." And third, the income from a nationalized
industry provided a significant revenue source for the government.'
The history of the Chilean telecommunications industry has both
private and public roots. In the early stages of Chile's
telecommunications industry the market was characterized by open
competition." In 1880 Thomas Edison allowed a US citizen residing
in Chile the opportunity to utilize his patent on telephone
technology, and the Chilean government granted a license to
Edison's representative." By 1927, Chile Telephone Company, the
descendant of the above operation, had emerged as the dominant
provider among many smaller regional competitors.' These
companies provided primarily local service and some long distance
service in industrial areas." Although most urban centers had access
to local service, inter-urban connections basically were limited to
Santiago and Valparaiso. :! The government remained uninvolved in
the industry except to grant licenses. "
The legal basis for telecommunications regulation came in 1925
with the enactment of the General Electric Services Lawv. The law
provided that electrical and telecommunications services "demanded
America, 3S Q. REv. ECON. & FIN. 421 (1998). available in LEXIS, Nes Library.
News Group file, All.
13. See Melo, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Melo, supra note 8, at 203, 204.
17. Id. at 204. The Chilean president granted the license on April 26. 180. The
company was named Compania de Telefonos de Edison. By 18S1, 250 telephones
were in service. The company changed its name to West Coast Telephone from 1.5S4
to 1889. In 1889, Chile Telephone Company acquired West Coast Telephone. At
that time the company had 2,907 telephones mainly in the Santiago and Valparaiso
areas. The Chilean population was 2.5 million.
18. Id
19. Id. Smaller privately owned telephone companies arose, but Chile
Telephone acquired many of them.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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significant attention of the public authorities."' The law established
the principles for government concessions in the electric and
telecommunications industries.' This marked the beginning of more
than minimal government involvement in telecommunications. This
Act was the governing body of law until 1982.2
In the 1930's, through a series of acquisitions, Chile Telephone
Company became Compania de Telefonos de Chile (CTC)."6
Meanwhile, the government's general economic policy was turning
away from a competitive model and towards government command.'
It was at this time that the Corporacion de Fomento de [a Producion
(CORFO) was formed.' Through CORFO, the government began to
promote state-owned industries.
Despite the trend toward government control, the
telecommunications industry remained in the private sphere subject
to minimal regulation.2 9 In 1930, the government and CTC entered
into a statutory contract. The contract granted CTC a fifty-year
concession subject to unlimited subsequent 30-year renewals." This
concession allowed CTC to operate in the entire country and
contained no service or interconnectivity requirements. 3 Under this
weak regulatory regime, CTC was allowed to set its own rates using
its own accounting system. 2 The contract merely required that CTC
"provide the public with a modem and efficient systera" based on
available technology.3
The General Electric Services Law was modified in 1959., The
modifications made the law directly applicable to
telecommunications and reaffirmed the licensing requirement. More
23. Id.
24. Id. at 205.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 206. The company was servicing 37,687 telephone lines at the time to a
population of 2.5 million.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 205. CORFO translated means Increased Production Corporation,
29. Id.
30. Id. at 205, 206. At this time, International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation (ITT) owned CTC.
31. Id. at 206; Law 4,791 was promulgated on January 23, 1930.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 207. The law, DFL 4, was enacted on July 24, 1959 and explicitly
covered telecommunications as opposed to the General Electric Services Law that
applied indirectly to the telecommunications industry.
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importantly, it provided that no single monopoly would be allowed in
the telecommunications industry." The law allowed geographic
concessions that could run for as long as ninety years, but it required
companies to interconnect with each other and use regulated
accounting standards:"  This law also created the General
Directorate of Electric, Gas, and Telecommunication Services
(GDEGTS), the first telecommunications regulatory body.'
GDEGTS was responsible for setting tariffs, analyzing rates, and
negotiating international arrangements- This new regulatory
agency, however, was weak. As a result, CTC refused to comply with
the new law and continued to operate under the framework
established in the 1930's that was significantly more favorable to
arc.
3 9
Throughout the 1950's, CTC remained the dominant
telecommunications provider in the nation.' Its strongest
competition came from Compania Nacional de Telefonos de Valdivia
(CNTV), who serviced only one-seventh of the phones serviced by
CTC.41 By the 1960's, CTC was failing to meet the local and long
distance service needs of those demanding service due in part to a
lack of adequate capital investment." CTC was providing inadequate
long distance service, which required an operator to connect every
call.' Also, it was unable to meet the connection demands of those
wanting local service who were willing to pay for it.' This inadequate
service may have stemmed from its virtual monopoly status," but the
government interpreted the situation as a call for government
control.4'
In 1964, recognizing the severe lack of long distance service, the
government sponsored the creation of Empresa Nacional Telefonica
35. Id. The law was passed on July 24, 1959.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Valdivia National Telephone (CNTV) was servicing 5.246 telephone lines
at the time. It was formed in 1893.
42. Id. at 208.
43. Id. at 207.
44. Id. at 208.
45. Economic theory suggests that when a firm has monopoly power it -ill fail to
innovate due to lack of meaningful competition.
46. See Melo, supra note 8, at 208.
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(ENTel), a subsidiary of CORFO.47 ENTel built its network with
microwave satellite technology and with government mandated
purchases of part of CTC's network,' ENTel soon became CTC's
largest competition. But because ENTel dominated the long distance
market and CTC dominated the local market, the companies posed
little threat to each other. Government action to enter the
telecommunications market as an operator rather than a regulator
marked a change in its policy towards the industry.
By the early 1970's, Chile's economy had become heavily
nationalized. 9 From 1965 to 1973 the Chilean government briskly
moved assets of virtually all industries from private hands into those
of the government.' This activity occurred primarily under the
Marxist regime of Salvador Allende between 1970 and 1973."1 By
1973, the government controlled one hundred percent of the utilities
industry, and eighty-five percent of the financial industry. ' The most
liberalized market was manufacturing with forty percent under
government command. 3
The telecommunications industry was not immune to this trend.
In 1970, the Chilean regulatory agency, GDEGTS, took control of
CTC and other telecommunications providers and incorporated the
companies into CORFO.- To formalize the takeover., the 1930's
agreement under which CTC was operating was revoked and
replaced with a command and control environment.
B. United States
One has to travel back to the late nineteenth century to find
competition in the United States local telecommunications market.
In 1876, Alexander Graham Bell applied for and eventually received
a patent for his invention, the telephone system. 6  Any early
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Vignau, supra note 4, at 233.
50. Id. at 235.
51. Id.
52 Id.
53. Id. Government ownership levels in other industries includcd: mining, 85
percent; communications, 70 percent; transportation, 70 percent.
54. See Melo, supra note 8, at 209. ENTel, which originated as a state-owned
enterprise, was already under government command.
55. Id. at 210.
56. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
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competition that existed was eliminated by the Bell system over the
next few decades mostly through acquisitions of independent local
exchange carriers (LECs). Moreover, the firm that would soon be
known as AT&T was aided in its monopolistic quest by being
anointed by United States regulators as the dominant provider of
telecommunications services nationwide."
In the early 1900's, AT&T and its competitors were not
regulated. Although telecommunications providers were considered
common carriers regulated by the Interstate Commerce Committee
(ICC), their only obligation was "to provide service on request at just
and reasonable rates, without unjust discrimination or undue
preference."5' Their rates, or tariffs, were not regulated.
Judicial decisions also fostered the imperial ambitions of AT&T.
Courts consistently held that AT&T as a long distance provider had
no obligation to connect to unaffiliated LECs."' This gave AT&T the
power to prevent its competitors from receiving its long distance
service and forced many of the competitors to sell out to AT&T.'
This activity ceased for a few years, but in 1921 when Congress gave
to the railroad-focused ICC the power to approve telephone mergers,
AT&T was under little oversight and continued its acquisitive
behavior."'
The economic theory offered at the time to justify the regulation
of the utility industries was natural monopoly theory.'2 Heavy capital
investment was required to build a telephone network. Poles, wires,
central swvitching systems, and connections into residences,
businesses, and government offices had to be established before even
one phone call could be transmitted. However, after the entire
network was established, the cost of operating the network and
57. See Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An essay on
Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLXTIVE HISTOR't UF THE
COMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934, at 3,7,9 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
58. See Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 7, 36 Stat. 539, 545.; See also Chen,
Symposium: Telecommunications Law: Unscramibling the Signals, Unbundlinq the
Law. Article: The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 835,839.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Willis-Graham Act of 1921, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (repealed by the
Communications Act of 1934). There is also speculation that a competitor was
developing wireless technology, but that AT&T's monopolistic actions eliminated
the competitor and ceased the emergence of the technology until almost a century
later.
62. See KLODT, supra note 1, at 298.
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providing the daily service was minimal relative to the initial cost. In
economic terms, this means that the industry is one characterized by
high fixed costs (the capital requirements) and low marginal costs.
Marginal cost refers to the cost to a firm of providing one additional
unit of service, and thus excludes fixed costs.
The natural monopoly theory applied to the industry led
legislators, executive officials, regulators, and economists to believe
that allowing competition in this industry would lead to wasteful
duplication and destructive results. If free competition were allowed,
they believed that multiple firms would enter the industry and
establish multiple telephone networks where only one would be
needed. Due to the high fixed costs, firms would not be able to
survive, as a finite number of possible customers existed to spread
among costly competing networks. Furthermore, the government
had an interest in assuring that this industry survived because it was
vital to the health of a fledgling national economy and also served
several safety concerns in the public interest.
The government had another goal in regulating the telephone
industry. It promoted a national telecommunications network to
encourage participation of all Americans in the economy and to
provide the safe and simple communication benefits of the telephone
to those in rural areas. Left to market forces, telephone service
would reach those in highly concentrated areas. Such areas were less
expensive to service because the same network could service many
more customers. Low costs translate into lower prices for consumers,
allowing more people to be able to afford the service. Rural areas,
however, were expensive to service. More extensive networks had to
be built to reach those in peripheral areas and fewer customers would
be demanding those networks. Fewer customers and more expensive
networks translate into higher prices for rural and high cost
customers who typically had lower incomes than urban consumers
would. Accordingly, rational, competitive, firms would concentrate
on the urban areas and leave the rural areas without service.
The first major federal law to regulate the telecommunications
industry in the United States was the Communications Act of 1934."'
However, at this point, state regulators were more instrumental than
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in shapng industry
behavior." State public utilities commissions ("PUCs") perpetuated
63. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L., ch. 652, 602,48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
64. See Eli M. Noam, Federal and State Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects
[Vol. 22:747
Telecommunications Reform in Chile and the United States
the AT&T monopoly by consistently favoring the incumbent Bell
system LEC over other competitors." In exchange for this favoritism,
the incumbent LECs were required to provide basic service at rates
below cost to low-income individuals and those living in low-density
areas."s States also required LECs to develop pricing schemes that
subsidized residential rates at the expense of commercial rates and
local service at the expense of long distance rates!" Because AT&T
was the dominant local, long distance and equipment provider, it
complied with this economically inefficient scheme.:
As interstate telephone traffic increased, the FCC assumed a
greater regulatory role, while local rate regulation remained in the
states' domain.69 If AT&T was the local monopolist, the FCC
required that AT&T provide basic telephone service at reasonable
rates to rural and high cost areas that the company otherwise would
not service."' Fostered by the state PUCs, AT&T developed an
elaborate scheme that allowed them to provide service to rural and
high cost areas at reasonable rates by overcharging urban and
business consumers.' Regulators' efforts to promote universal
service were eventually successful in providing virtually all
Americans with access to basic telephone service.
H. Privatization, Liberalization, and Deregulation
Technological advancements, the proliferation of use and
demand for telecommunications services (e.g., facsimile, cellular
phones, Internet), and political pressure forced regulators to allow
new players to enter the market.- Potential competitors and
economists argued that technological advancements had altered the
industry's natural monopoly status that once justified the regulatory
of Deregulation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 949, 954-55 (1983). Due to restrictions placed on
the federal government by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
the federal government's jurisdiction extended only over calls that crossed interstate
lines. Long distance traffic accounted for only two percent of AT&T's revenues at
this point.
65. See Chen, supra note 58, at 840.
66. Id. at 841.
67. Id. The details of the pricing scheme are beyond the scope of this note.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 841.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See KLODT, supra note 1, at 207.
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structure. 74 Those pressures played out differently in Chile and the
United States.
A. Chile
In 1973, a military coup installed Augusto Pinochet Ugarte as
president." This government began implementing privatization
policies throughout the economy, including the telecommunications
industry." Chile was the first Latin American country to proceed
down the privatization path.' Privatization is the process of
transferring assets from the public sector, the state, into private
hands.76 One or more private firms produce the goods or services
once provided by state-owned enterprises.
To show its commitment to reform, the government issued a
proclamation stating that where there is a private business interest
the government should not be involved as a business." Specific
government efforts to sell government property included offering
strong pension incentives for employees that purchased shares of the
state-owned firms.""
Privatization efforts in Chile occurred in two stages. The first
stage, from 1973 to 1975, included the return of land that was
confiscated by the previous Marxist government. " In the second
stage, beginning in 1975 and lasting through the mid-1980's, the state-
owned telecommunications firms were placed back in the hands of
private actors.2 During this period of state-ownership, technological
progress in the telecommunications industry had stagnated. By 1977,
the waiting list for new phone connections equaled 46 percent of
installed phones. CTC was operating 466,000 lines, only a 32,000-line
increase since privatization efforts began in 1975. Three other
competitors (Arica, CTCoy, and CNTV) combined had less than
74. Id.
75. See Melo, supra note 8, at 210.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Raines, supra note 5.
79. See Melo, supra note 8, at 210. This policy was announced in the Declaration
of Government Principles (Declaracion de Principios del Gobierno).
80. See Vignau, supra note 4, at 240, 241. See also MELO, supra note 8, at 210.
Law DFL 2,758 of 1979 allowed employee bonuses to be paid in stock. Law 18,372
allowed advanced compensation agreements. Much of ENTel was privatized
through the newly privatized employee pension funds.
81. Id.
82. See Melo, supra note 8, at 212-15.
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21,000 lines."
In 1977, the regulatory arm, GDEGTS, was restructured and
replaced by SUBtel. ' This agency was given responsibility for rate
regulation, technical standards, concessions, licenses, and
international negotiations, among other things." This agency remains
the regulatory body today. Also, antitrust courts traditionally have
had a significant influence on economic policy in the
telecommunications industry and still do today.'
In 1979 CTC was forced to accept an open, competitive
environment in telephone lines.' Previously, CTC had the exclusive
right to connect each subscriber." This action was part of a larger
national policy to liberalize the market and marked the beginning of
the return to competition in the local service market." In 1981, as a
result of the government's abolition of the its telecommunications
monopoly,' two private CTC competitors were granted licenses to
operate local senices in high-income areas of Santiago." To promote
their success, the government prevented CTC from investing in those
areas.
92
Significant legal reform was delayed until the enactment of the
General Telecommunications Lav of 1982, codifying the reform
efforts begun in the 1970's and repealing the 1959 legislation'" The
law stipulated that no exclusive concessions would be given for
telecommunications providers, and that government involvement in
tariff setting would be minimal and would be left largely to the free
market. To obtain a license, market participants only were required
83. Id. at 212. In 1977, the waiting list for new phone connections equaled 46
percent of installed phones. CTC was operating 466,0tI lines, only a 32,U'}U-line
increase since privatization efforts began in 1975. Three other competitors (Arica,
CTCoy, and CNTV combined had less than 21,000 lines).
84. Id. SUBtel (Subsecretaria de Telecomunicaciones) is the
telecommunications regulatory agency within the Transportation and
Telecommunication Ministry.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 214.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See K. Knode & R. Turner, Chile's Telecommunications Market Cntintws to
Expand, U.S. DEP'T Coi. LA-C Bus. BuLL., February 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, News Group file, All.
91. See Melo, supra note 8, at 214.
92 Id.
93. Id. at 215; see also Knode & Turner, supra note 90.
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to provide interconnectivity with other providers.' This body of law
remains the main governing instrument in Chile today.
Privatization efforts in the telecommunications industry began in
earnest in 1982 with the sale of CNT and CTCoy.95 The government
began selling shares of CTC and ENTel in 1985.96 The government
briefly entertained the idea of splitting up CTC into four or five
regional companies (similar to what occurred in the United States),
but the idea was abandoned because investors were not interested in
a fragmented CTC. By 1991, all of its telephone holdings, including
CTC and ENTel, had been privatized and were owned completely by
private investors.
Chile, along with the other developing countries undergoing
similar processes, experienced several problems throughout this
process. First, the government instantly recognized a significant
reduction in revenue due to the lost fees generated by providing
telecommunications services." This problem was mitigated in Chile,
however, since privatization produced increased interest in Chilean
firms by foreign capital.'0 Second, years of government control and
minimal investment produced an antiquated infrastructure barely
capable of functioning in a modern world.' This problem also was
less pronounced in Chile than in other developing countries since
Chile had a long history of private ownership during which a fully
digitized network was established." Third, even though the industry
was privatized and liberalized, it still required a regulatory regime to
monitor its activities for the public interest. Latin American
countries, including Chile to a lesser extent, lacked appropriate
governmental structures (with appropriate regulatory strength) to
deal with these functions."l
As evidenced by the experience in the United States, private
94. See Melo, supra note 8, at 215.
95. Id. at 216. CNT was later renamed Telefonica del Sur.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 218.
98. Id. at 219.
99. See Raines, supra note 5.
100. See Ramirez, supra note 12.
101. See Raines, supra note 5.
102. See Ramirez, supra note 12.
103. See Raines, supra note 5. Latin American governments generally lack
sufficient regulatory regimes because there is often a shortage of professionals with
regulatory expertise. Also, these countries' governmental structures suffer from
political instability.
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ownership can exist absent competition. To achieve a competitive
environment, Chile also pursued a liberalization policy.
Liberalization refers to the policy of promoting market growth and
facilitating the entry of new firms funded by private capital.' This
policy produced competition in all telecommunications sub-sectors
(long distance, cellular, information services, etc.) except local
service. 5 Several players existed in the local market; however, due
to its historically dominant position, CTC controlled almost 90
percent of the local market.'3
B. United States
While the Latin American state-owned models lagged far behind
the United States technologically and in infrastructure, the regulatory
framework in the United States also produced a system that was
technologically deficient and slow to innovate.
Industry pressure and changing views on the benefits of
regulation produced a wave of deregulation in the United States.t ;
Deregulation is defined as the lifting of price and other pervasive
market control measures to allow the competitive process to
determine price, supply, and demand. c'  Competitive pressures in the
equipment and long distance markets drove this movement, which
was ignited in the 1940s and 1950s when the FCC and DC Circuit
ruled that non-Bell system equipment did not threaten the integrity
of the network."' The opening to competition of the long distance
markets came when the FCC allowed Microwave Communications,
Inc. (MCI) to provide long distance service through its new
microwave technology, and it mandated that AT&T provide
interconnection services non-discriminatorily"' Allowing
competition in areas where AT&T traditionally recouped the lost
revenues incurred by subsidizing local rates, contributed significantly
104. See Melo, supra note 8, at 217.
105. Id. at 219.
106. Id.
107. See KLODT, supra note 1, at 298.
108. Id.
109. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, ECONOMIC REGULATION 214 (1994).
110. See Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Service, 11 F.C.C.
1033, 1036 (1948); Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Circuit
1956); See generally Chen, supra note 58, at 84344. The FCC did retreat from this
stance periodically.
111. See In re Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI), 18 F.C.C.
2d 953 (1969); See also generally Chen, supra note 58.
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to the breakdown of the regulatory model.
The breakdown of AT&T's monopoly was completed by the
Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) of federal district court Judge
Harold Greene, resulting from an antitrust case brought by the
United States Department of Justice. The MFJ mandated the
divestiture of AT&T."' Under the MFJ, AT&T was divided into one
long distance company (AT&T) and seven local exchange carriers
(LECs). The LECs retained local monopolies within their regions.
The resulting "baby bell" monopolies, or regional bell operating
companies (RBOCS) were BellSouth, BellAtlantic, NYNEX,
Ameritech, Southwestern Bell, Pacific Bell, and US West."3
Three major bans were placed on the baby bells-bans on
providing long distance services, manufacturing telecommunications
equipment, and offering information services."4 These restrictions
were placed on the LECs so that they could not use their monopoly
power to discourage competition in those markets. The court
monitored the restrictions from 1984 through 1996. The only entry
barrier that was lifted over the twelve-year period was the
information services barrier."5
Although LECs were banned from providing long distance
services outside their regions (interLATA"6 service), they were
allowed to provide the toll services within their own regions."' Judge
Greene allowed this "short-haul" (intraLATA) activity to augment
the RBOCs' "financial viability"."8 LECs continued to operate much
as they had under the traditional regulatory model. "RBOCs and
other incumbent LECs by and large retained the mysterious blend of
costly universal service obligations and common-cost subsidies
112. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,140-43 (D.D.C 1982). The
monitoring of this judgment was the dominant means of regulating the
telecommunications industry until the Telecommunications Act of 19)96 was enacted.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See United States v. Western Electric Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1575-76, 1582 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). The barrier on information services was lifted in 1993.
116. LATA means local access transport area. This means that a baby bell was
not allowed to offer long distance service originating in its region and terminating in
another baby bell region.
117. See United States v. Western Electric Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1108 (D.D.C.
1983).
118. The intraLATA/ interLATA distinction ironically installed the very sort of
horizontal territorial restraint that antitrust law condemns." See Chen, supra note
58, at 854 (citing United States v. Topco, 405 U.S 596, 608 (1972)).
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cloaked in the fog of state PUCs accounting.""" Although
competition arguably emerged in the long distance and equipment
markets,'2 local service was still operating under the regional
monopoly regime a decade after AT&T's break-up.
re.Comparison of Current Basic Local Services Markets
A. Chile Today
The 1982 General Law of Telecommunications provides the
basis for competition in Chilean telecommunications services.Y The
law requires that a service provider obtain a concession from SUBTel
to either establish a network or provide services using existing
facilities.' SUBTel supervises the services provided by setting
technical guidelines, promoting increased penetration rates, and
reviewing tariffs."'
In 1994, the Chilean government (through SUBTel) issued new
regulations, Telecommunications Law 3-A."' The regulations
significantly amended the existing General Telecommunications Law
and were designed to promote continued liberalization and
meaningful competition." There are minimal restrictions to entry
based on the type of service a company provides. For example, CTC
may freely compete in the long distance market-and it does. The
only restrictions placed on companies entering new service areas
required that firms provide inter-connectivity between their networks
and form a separate subsidiary in order to compete.' The law also
maintained maximum tariff levels for the local markets to be
readjusted every five years."
The regulations also promoted the use of Chile's antitrust
policies to enforce competition in the market. For example, before
119. See Chen, supra note 58; See Daniel F. Spulber. Dcretdating
Telecommunications, 12 YALEJ. ON REG. 25,50-52 (1995).
120. Because AT&T, MCI, and Sprint dominate the market, they may be setn as
an oligopoly.
121. See Knode & Turner, supra note 90.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Melo, supra note 8, at 221; see also Raines, supra note 5.
127. See Telecommunications Law 3-A. The maximum tariff was set in I94 and
is scheduled for reevaluation in early 1999.
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the regulations were issued, Telefonica de Espana (TDE) owned
significant interests in both CTC and ENTel, by far the two dominant
players in the Chilean market." In accordance with its antitrust
policy, the government forced TDE to sell its interest in one of the
companies.9 TDE choose to divest its shares of ENTel.!'3
A significant part of Telecommunications Law 3-A allowed local
service providers to compete in the long distance market.'31 For
example, CTC could freely compete in the long distance market.
Domestic local providers could enter the long distance market
through a subsidiary while using their existing local network
equipment.'32 As such, CTC entered the market in 1995.133 By 1998 it
had gained over thirty percent of the domestic long distance market
and about twenty percent of the international long distance market.",
Its domestic long distance market share is equal to that of ENTel, the
dominant provider before the onset of competition.3
Despite these pro-competitive reforms, including the fact that
consumers are allowed to choose their local provider, the local
market is still concentrated and dominated by CTC. By most
estimates, CTC has about ninety percent of the local business, despite
several competitors in the market.' SUBTel has divided the country
into thirteen geographic regions.' About one-half of Chile's
fourteen million inhabitants are located in the metropolitan Santiago
area, the country's capital.' Most of the competition occurs in the
Metropolitan region that includes Santiago, (About one-third of the
country's more than two million fixed lines are in this area.")
Current competitors include CTC, ENTel, VTR, Telex-Chile,
128. See Knode & Turner, supra note 90. At the time, Telefonica de Espaila
owned 44 percent of CTC and 20 percent of ENTel.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. CrC was subject to very forgiving maximum market share caps from
1995 through 1998, which it reached each year.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Compania de Telecomm de Chile Local Current Outlook to Stable,
BUSINESS WIRE, Oct. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group file,
All.
137. See Competition Intensifies In Chilean Local Telephony Market, TELECOM
MARKETS, Aug. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, News G roup file, All.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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CMET and Telefonica Manquehue. ENTel, VTR, and Telex-Chile
entered the market in either 1995 or 1996 after Law 3-A took effect.
CMET and Telefonica Manquehue have been competing in the
region since the early 1980's, but have managed to gain only about 3
percent of the total market. A significant factor contributing to their
lack of success, however, is the fact that CTC actively tried to prevent
the companies from interconnecting with its network. This
prohibited activity was not stopped, perhaps the result of a weak
regulatory body.
Also, competition exists in regions V, VI, and VII, the regions
surrounding the Metropolitan region. The relatively dense
population levels provide more profit potential than the outlying
districts. However, firms have recently moved into the rural areas.
Telcoy and Conatel have served regions X and X1 since the late
nineteenth century. In fact, until 1996, CTC did not even have a
license to operate in those areas. CTC and VTR have entered rural
regions to capture some of this market.
Although CTC has continued to dominate, and arguably
monopolize, the local market since the 1994 reforms that were meant
to promote meaningful competition, its rivals have not conceded
defeat. Most players have invested heavily to develop proprietary
networks. This activity is apparent particularly in the Metropolitan
region, but also in less populated areas. The Metropolitan region
accounts for about one-half of Chile's fourteen million inhabitants
and about one-third of the phone lines. Although meaningful
competition in one of thirteen regions may seem dismal, it is not.
From the consumer standpoint, one-half of the Chilean population
has several choices of service providers.
Chile has much more room for growth and competition in the
local market than the United States. Chile's penetration rate is much
lower than that of the United States."' Therefore, Chile has a large
market of people who do not have basic service willing to sign up and
pay. For example, CTC has a significant waiting list for those who
want basic local service. Before liberalization, a person on CTC's
waiting list would wait about two years to receive service. '  In 1994,
CTC's waiting list numbered 117,000"2. It decreased to about 50,00
140. See United States Department of State, Chilc-Te'commications Scetor
Market, INDUSTRY SECTOR ANALYSIS, Sept. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, News Group file, All [hereinafter Telecommunications Sctor Markctl.
14L Id.
142. Id.
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over the next two years, but in 1997, the waiting list rose again to
110,000.141 In the United States, the penetration rate is about 95
percent, and about half of those without service do not want it. This
difference evidences the incredibly large untapped market potential
for local services in Chile.
B. United States Today
The 1996 Act was viewed as watershed legislation in the
telecommunications industry. Before the Act's passage, the industry
operated under the outdated regulatory scheme of 1934."' The Act's
stated purpose was to deregulate and promote competition in all
segments of the industry.45 Today, competition exists in the long
distance, cellular, equipment, and information services segments, but
not in local service.' The competitive structure of the local
telecommunications market is essentially the same as before passage
of the Act. Despite the Act's goal of introducing vigorous
competition into the local market, the local bell monopolies still
control ninety-eight percent of the local loop.'47 Moreover, prices for
local telephone service have increased, not decreased, since the Act's
passage."4
The Act requires all states to allow competition by stating, "no
state or local statute or regulation, or other State oT local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service."'49 Also it gives cable operalors the right
to provide local service without first obtaining a cable franchise or
any other local permission.5 Legally, entry is open. But temporary
143. Id. at 71.
144. PETER HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: A SPECIAL
REPORT 8 (1996).
145. See Susan Ness, FCC Commissioner, Remarks at the Florida
Communications Policy Symposium, Tallahassee (February 17, 1999)(transcript
available at the Federal Communication Commission).
146. Id. Some argue that the long distance market is an oligapoly of three
companies: AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. In an oligopolistic market, market share is
concentrated among a few firms.
147. See Competition in Telecommunications: Hearing of the House Judiciary
Committee, 106'b Cong. (1998) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
148. Id.
149. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996).
150. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(A)(i)
(1996).
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barriers that the Act puts in place are hindering actors from
achieving the Act's goals.
The incumbent LECs have a marked advantage. Their existing
networks allow them automatically to offer their services. Potential
competitors must build their own networks 1 The only way they can
offer competitive services in the interim is to resell the capacity of
incumbent LECs. "
Bringing competition to the local market is arguably the largest
challenge facing the United States telecommunications industry
today. However, many argue that the regulatory scheme put in place
by the Act to monitor the dominant incumbent LECs has been more
harmful to competition than reformatory. Before LECs may enter
the long distance market they need to show that they have allowed
meaningful competition in the local market.'"
To show that competition exists in their region, LECs must pass
an extensive checklist promulgated by the FCC." Regulators and
151. See HUBER, supra note 144, at S.
152- Id. Incumbent LECs must offer their capacity to potential competitors at
wholesale rates.
153. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1996).
154. Id. The basic obligations are as follows: Every telecommunications carrier
has an affirmative duty to interconnect with other carriers and is enjoined from
installing network features that prevent telecommunications network
interconnectivity. Every LEC has a duty: 1) to permit resale of its services at
wholesale rates without unreasonable or discriminatory conditions 2) to provide
number portability 3) to provide dialing parity and nondiscriminatory access to
telephone numbers, operator services, directory assistance and directory listings 4) to
afford access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way 5) to establish reciprocal
compensation arrangements for the transport or termination of telecommunications
6) to continue to provide exchange access, information access, and exchange services
for such access in accordance with whatever equal access and nondiscrimination
requirements apply to that carrier on the date immediately preceding enactment.
Incumbent LECs and their successors and assigns are saddled with additional
obligations. Incumbent LECs have a duty: 1) to negotiate interconnection
agreements in good faith 2) to provide interconnection for the transmission and
routing of exchange and exchange access services at any technically feasible point
within the carrier's network. The interconnection must be equal in quality to that
provided to any affiliate,, subsidiary or other party and it must be on rates, terms,
and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 3) to provide
unbundled access to network elements at any technically feasible point on just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms 4) to offer for resale, at wholesale rates.
any services provided to subscribers who are not carriers. No discriminatory
conditions may be placed on resale 5) to provide physical collocation of equipment
necessary for interconnection or unbundled access on rates, terms, and conditions
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Rural telephone companies obtain
an automatic exemption from the obligations of the incumbent LECs until it receives
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legislators believed that the desire to enter the lucrative long distance
market would provide LECs with strong incentive to allow
competition in their local markets. To the contrary, predatory
practices of the entrenched local monopolies have pxcevented the
successful entrance of new players into traditional "baby bell"
markets. Industry experts have stated that the refusal of LECs to
open the local access lines is the mechanism preventing companies
such as AT&T from entering the local market.' "The [Act] was
supposed to open up local telephone monopolies, what we got
instead was stonewalling, incessant legal challenges and greater
concentration."'56 This has left the local market in the same position
as when the regional monopolies were created, except that three
mergers have decreased the number of geographical monopolies."t1
Some CLECs have built their own loops in order to compete in the
profitable high-density business districts of large metropolitan areas,
but this action has not helped residential or lower density markets.
C. Effect of Universal Service Policies on Local Competition
Chile
Although Chile has a significantly lower penetration rate for
basic local service, it has not been as vigorous in suppoiting a policy
aimed at raising its penetration rate. The competitive policies
recently enacted have improved penetration rates; however, much
more progress is needed if full penetration is to be a goal of the
Chilean government.
As expected through the liberalization process, competition has
a bona fide request for interconnectivity from a competitor.
155. See Michael Armstrong, Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Remarks before a
National Press Club luncheon (February 10, 1999), available in LEXIS, News
Library, News Group file, All.
156. See Competition in Telecommunications: Hearing of the House Judiciary
Committee, (1998) (statement of Kelly Walsh). Also note recent remarks from an
FCC Commissioner, admitting that most Americans do not have a choice of local
carriers and that the benefits of local telephone competition for the most part
"remain the promise of the future." See Susan Ness, FCC Commissioner, Remarks
at the Florida Communications Policy Symposium, Tallahassee (February 17,
1999)(transcript available at the Federal Communication Commission).
157. Id. Mr. Walsh has stated that the merger of regional local ionopolies only
moves us further away from achieving local competition. Southwestern Bell (SBC)
merged with Pacific Telesis in 1997 and the federal government approved SBC's
acquisition of Ameritech on October 8, 1999. Also, BellAtlantic and NYNEX have
merged.
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dictated that it is not efficient for firms to subsidize basic local service
with higher commercial and business rates. Instead of initiating a
universal service policy, the government has left the process to
competition and has not reacted to the increase in local rates and the
corresponding decrease in urban and business rates."'
Perhaps realizing that a telecommunications network reaches its
maximum benefits for the national economy when its entire
population has access to the network, the Chilean government has
implemented the Telecommunications Development Fund. This
fund, administered by SUBTel, provides subsidies to companies that
commit to developing telecommunications network in the rural and
low-density, high cost areas. " ' SUBTel identifies areas where basic
telephone service is needed and solicits bids from service providers.
The provider asking for the smallest subsidy is awarded the contract.
In 1996, eight projects were awarded to Chilesat while the remaining
twenty-six were awarded to CTC." Wireless technology, rather than
land lines, is being deployed in rural areas due to the significant costs
savings of wireless technology."' Considering that the lowest bidder
must carry out these projects, using wireless technology over more
expensive fiber optic lines results in significant savings. But Cable
lines are installed when it is impossible to install wiqreless
technology.6 2 The Telecommunications Development Fund spent $3
million in its first year and $15 million in 1997."' This covers about
one-half of the needs in isolated areas." Still only one telephone is
available to every three hundred inhabitants."'
Most significant for competitive purposes, this subsidy is not
reflected indirectly in the providers' rates. More lucrative services or
less elastic"' customers are not subsidizing basic telephone service for
the "telephone poor." Although all subsidies are distortionary from
an economic perspective, this explicit general subsidy from a general
158. See Federal Communications Commission, Universal Access: Carpe Diem:
Seizing Opportunities in the Global Marketplace, Oct. 13, 199S, available in LEXIS.
News Library, News Group file, All.
159. Id. at 24.
160. See Telecommunications Sector Market, supra note 140, at 70.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. In this context, if you are a "less elastic" customer, your demand of or need
for the product does not change if the price increases dramatically.
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fund minimizes the allocative efficiency distortion. Regulators
subsidize telecommunications through different, less economically
efficient means in the United States.
United States
The United States has achieved virtually complete panetration in
providing basic local service. Under the AT&T monopoly, it reached
this regulatory objective through internal and explicit cross
subsidization. '67 Long distance carriers implicitly supported provision
of basic service to rural and low-income individuals by bearing a
disproportionate amount of the costs associated with maintaining
central switching stations. Also, AT&T charged higher than market
rates to its business and commercial consumers and below cost rates
to its residential consumers.
The subsidization scheme was maintained until the 1996 Act
changed the rules. In order to promote competition, regulators
realized that the implicit subsidies were not producing market prices.
Specifically, because AT&T's long distance rates were subsidizing
local service, its long distance rates were artificially high. A new
entrant to the long distance market could charge prices more
reflective of actual cost that would be much lower than the price
AT&T would be forced to charge. Consequently, the Act required
that the subsidy scheme become an external fee charged to all
telecommunications providers.1" The Act required thai this fee be
placed in a "universal service fund", and then be distributed to the
companies that service the unprofitable rural and high cost areas'"
The FCC and state regulators are in the process of removing the
hidden subsidies and making them explicit. Regulators are devising
the system to comply with the Act's mandate that the subsidy scheme
be competitively neutral,"' although distortionary cross-subsidies
remain especially at the state level.
This fund distorts the competitive market by increasing the cost
of service to those able to pay for local service. However, policy
makers have determined that the benefits of having all Americans
linked into the communications network outweigh the competitive
167. See Chen, supra note 58.
168. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), 47 U.S.C. 254 (1996).
169. Id.; see also Federal Communication Commission Universal Service Order
No. 97-60421.
170. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 101(a), 47 U.S.C. 254 (1996).
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drawbacks that the subsidy creates.
Aspects of the program remain internalized, however.
Regulators still require LECs to engage in price averaging. That is
they are required to charge the same price to a consumer in a dense,
less expensive area as it charges to a rural customer, for whom
provision of service is significantly more expensive. This structure
creates the incentive for new competitors to enter the market and
serve the less expensive customers at lower prices. This process is
called "cream skimming."'' If the rates were priced competitively,
that is, based on costs, the LEC would be able to offer competitive
prices also. This situation creates an incentive for LECs to pressure
regulators to prevent new entrants from "cream skimming.'-
Although this may seem like a fair act by LECs, competition and
innovation in the local markets would be forestalled.
D. Effect of Technological Convergence on Local Competition in
the Future
Regulatory reform efforts of both governments may be eclipsed
by the potentially revolutionary effect that technological
developments may have on the telecommunications industry.
Regulators and elected officials must bear these developments in
mind before undertaking further reform efforts.
The structure of the local telephone network today requires that
calls travel through the incumbent LECs central switching station.
This structure creates a "bottleneck" that enables the incumbent
LEC to exclude competitors. Considering this obstacle, the greatest
prospect for a competitive local market may lie in the establishment
of additional proprietary local networks. Most Chilean competitors
are investing in their own networks. This is beginning to develop in
the United States too.
Chile
Many competitors in the local Chilean market see technological
convergence as the key to breaking CTC's hold on the Chilean local
market.' Although most competitors are building their own fiber
171. See PIERCE, supra note 109, at 221.
172- Id.
173. See Carlos A. Primo Braga et al., Telecommunications in Latin America and
the Caribbean." The Role of Foreign Capital; the Changing Role of International
Capital in Latin America, Q. REV. ECON. & FIN., September 22, 1998, at 409,
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optic networks 74 in an effort to capture market share from CTC,
many players are investing heavily in cellular, PCS, and cable
television technologies. 75 Technological advancements are expected
to provide the ability to transmit voice, data, and video signals all
over the same coaxial cable. For example, VTR is relying on this
strategy. Recently, it sold its domestic long distance and wireless
business to CTC in order to concentrate solely on developing its
coaxial cable network so that it may provide integrated local, cable,
Internet, data, and video transmission service. 6  In 1998, VTR
launched a campaign to provide free telephone line installation to its
cable customers along with 25 to 40 percent discounts in fixed
charges."
ENTel, among others, attempts to differentiate itself by
providing high-tech, value-added services in the local market. It
concentrates on the high volume corporate business in the
Metropolitan area."' It has invested over US $200 million to develop
a latest-generation access network in Santiago, and expects to expand
into other cities. 79 Telex-Chile's Telesat currently concentrates its
operations in the Metropolitan districts, but has investment plans in
place for other areas."
CTC has responded to this competitive pressure."" In 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group file, All.
174. Id.
In Chile, the liberalization of the basic services market in 1994 has ushered
in a technology race among the top four service providers: Cornpania de
Telecomunicaciones de Chile, S.A. (CTC), Entel Chile S.A., Telex-Chile
S.A., and VTR Telecomunicaciones S.A. Competition has forced each
service provider to install massive fiber optic transmission networks and
sophisticates switching platforms... Each of Chile's top four service
providers has built a metropolitan fiber optic ring within Santiago, the
nation's capital.
See Catherine Forster Connolly and Hector Hernandez, Pyramid Research,
<http:llteledotcom.comli197ar/tocindex.html (visited February 20, 1999).
175. Id. Cellular subscribers in Chile total 2 percent of the population while
beepers account for I percent. Compare these rates to 15 percent and 40 percent,
respectively, in the United States.
176. See Telecommunications Sector Market, supra note 140.
177. Id.
178. Id. ENTel also has a significant presence on Easter Island and has built up a
pay phone network of 770 phones.
179. Id. ENTel plans to invest $400 million in its access network by 2000 with a
goal of obtaining 12 percent market share by the same time.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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CTC's connection revenues decreased by 25.6% due to discounts
offered in response to competitor's lower rates.' " Also, the company
realizes the potential competition from the convergence of cable and
telecommunications technology. In fact, CTC unsuccessfully tried to
merge with VTR to access its existing cable network and customers.'
The Chilean Supreme Court blocked this move on antitrust
grounds."M CTC may dominate the local telecommunications market
in Chile right now, but it seems that the strong commitment to capital
investment and convergence technology may turn the tide to allow
effective local competition.
United States
The barriers established by the 1996 Act are an impediment to
service convergence. The regulatory barriers placed on LECs
prevent the LECs from entering non-local markets and the LECs'
predatory practices such as not allowing competitors access to their
network prevent other service providers from offering local service as
part of a "one-stop shop" package. Recent industry activity,
however, may allow potential competitors to overcome this problem.
AT&T has announced a merger with Tele-communications, Inc.
(TCI), one of the largest national cable operators. Cable networks
have the capability to transmit voice signals as well as data and video.
After a failed attempt to enter certain local markets, such as
Northern California, AT&T's acquisition of TCI represents its new
local strategy. AT&T will be able to connect its long distance service
directly to its proprietary local cable network, eliminating
interconnectivity barriers. Using its coaxial cable network and
AT&T's telecommunications expertise, the new company potentially
will be able to mount a serious challenge to the baby bells. AT&T's
ability to provide local service will be delayed, however, until it
configures the cable network to transmit voice signals. With these
technological advancements, the problem of predatory practices by
LECs is diminished, but still remains for connecting calls outside of
the firm's proprietary network.
Cellular providers have been successful in reaching consumers
182. Id.
183. Latin American Information Services, CTC Buys Out Wireless Partner,
LAGNIAPPE LETTER, Jan. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ne%%s Group
file, All.
184. Id.
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nationwide. However, because people have yet to accept their
cellular phone as a substitute for local service, the cellular market has
not affected the stronghold that the incumbent LECs have on their
regions. Furthermore, the Act proscribes any LEC from using the
cellular market to show that sufficient competition exists in its region
and warrant its entrance into the long distance market.
IV.Suggestions for Reform in the United States
The Chilean experience provides positive and negative guidance
for the United States as it contemplates reform. For instance, the
Chilean regulatory framework is too weak in that it does not enforce
its interconnectivity requirement adequately and it allowed CTC to
unfairly leverage its proprietary local networks to gain significant
market share in the long distance market. However, some of Chile's
policies would be beneficial to the United States industry.:
Facilitate technological advancements. Technological
advancements in coaxial cable and wireless service among others
present to potential competitors the opportunity to develop a
proprietary local network, significantly decreasing the current level
of dependence on incumbent LECs. Cable companies appear to be
the most vital competitors for the LECs as they have an established
customer base upon which to build a comprehensive service offering
of cable, local, internet access, video, and data transmission. Chilean
companies are investing in their own networks. They are following
the above-suggested strategy and are buoyed by the fact that there
are no regulatory impediments in their way. United States policy
makers could consider offering incentives such as tax credits to
encourage investment in proprietary networks. Although success
may come slowly in both countries, the potential surely exists.
Revisit Certain Aspects of the 1996 Act. The United States
should revisit the thirteen-point checklist that regulates LEC
entrance into the long distance market. At one end of the spectrum
are Chile's lax regulations that monitor local firms' entrance into the
long distance market. To some extent, the fears of local dominance
that prompted the FCC to implement the checklist have materialized
in CTC's domination of the entire Chilean telecommunications
market. At the other end of the spectrum are the United States'
prohibitive regulations. The regulations may prevent local
companies from unfairly leveraging their access power in other
segments of the market. However, if local companies were able to
compete in the long distance market without unfairly using their local
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networks as leverage, local companies would be able to realize some
profit in the long distance market, which would alleviate the LECs'
need to jealously guard its diminishing local profits.
Monitor Incumbent LECs' Practices More Closely. The domestic
market has been hampered severely by the predatory practices of the
incumbent LECs. Actions such as delaying connections, providing
poor connections, and prolonged litigation on many of these issues
have contributed significantly to what many observers view as a
reform effort stalled. Regulators need to address this issue as a part
of any reform effort. While these predatory practices may benefit the
individual LECs in the short-term, they are damaging the long-term
structure of the telecommunications market.
Ensure that State and Local Regulators' Actions are Consistent
with the Act. Chile has the advantage of having one regulatory body,
SUBTel. Regulators in the United States are split between federal
and state bodies that often have competing interests. The 1996 Act
preempted some traditional state authority, but state PUCs retain
influence over several matters such as universal service, rate-making.
and policing incumbent LECs' access policies. Given that incumbent
LECs' failure to comply with open access policies is a crucial factor in
the failure of a local competitive market, federal regulators and
courts need to vigorously enforce the Act's provision that prohibits
states from acting in a manner inconsistent with the Act's
competitive goals.
Consider further revision of the universal service policy. Virtually
all Americans have basic telecommunications service today due in
large part to the universal service policies promoted by the FCC and
state regulators. The same governmental entities have made
significant progress in externalizing and simplifying the once
convoluted program that existed under the old regime. Most of the
financial burden of funding universal service policies is now spread
among all telecommunications providers, not just LECs. However,
the policies in place are not competitively neutral. Although Chile
does not have a universal service policy as aggressive or successful as
that of the United States, it does have a program that is competitively
neutral. Chile does not allow price averaging to subsidize high cost
areas. The market yields higher prices in rural and high cost areas,
but the prices more accurately reflect market conditions and facilitate
meaningful competition especially in high density and business
markets. Rural and high cost price support is provided through
direct explicit subsidies from the government through a bidding
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process. FCC and state regulators should examine this framework
program that removes all hidden subsidies from con;umer prices.
Congress could appropriate direct subsidies from the general fund
budget to companies in order to address the needs of rural customers
and the political realities of keeping residential rates down.
V. Conclusion
The once entrenched belief that the telecommunications
industry is a natural monopoly has been weakened considerably over
the past few decades. Many industry observers and participants
acknowledge the competitive structure of most segments of the
industry - e.g., long distance, cellular, and advanced services. But,
the debate continues over the structure of the local market. Many
feel that local competition is not attainable because it still exhibits
classic natural monopoly characteristics. I would argue the opposite.
The technology is available for potential competitors to bypass the
incumbent LEC's access bottleneck by building their own networks.
Although CTC in Chile has maintained above a ninety percent
share of the local market, the potential for increased competition is
not impeded by a regional monopolistic structure. Smaller
competitors are investing heavily to establish their own local
networks. By utilizing coaxial cable and wireless technology, they are
able to build these networks at a cost significantly lower than a
traditional network. The prospect for meaningful competition in
more densely populated regions is high. Multiple actors are fighting
for local business and have caused CTC to react to this threat by
lowering its prices.
Chile's regulatory framework places minimal distortionary
restrictions on market entrants. Minimal restrictions allow the
market to more efficiently determine supply, demand, and price,
although they do not address the advantage that CTC has by being
the historical dominant provider. Also, Chile's success in
maintaining an explicit subsidy scheme that minimizes the distortion
of rates allows the market to function more smoothly.
Despite the promises of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a
competitive local telecommunications market in the United States
has yet to emerge. The new regulatory framework discussed above
has created perverse incentives for incumbent local exchange carriers
to vigorously defend their regional monopolies and retain effective
monopolies in their respective local exchange markets.
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Technological advancements are changing the nature of the market
and are allowing competitors to enter with relatively lower costs.
Domestic policy makers need to revise the regulatory framework to
promote, not inhibit, competition and to not interfere with the
technological advancements that are making a competitive local
market more attainable. We should not allow well-intended
regulatory policies to prohibit the goal for which they were enacted.
* * *
